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Abstract
Marked by investments, loans, and finance, China’s engagement in Africa has grown
swiftly. Amongst sub-Saharan Africa’s many trading and developing partners, China remains the
biggest partner and investor with an increase in trade relations.1 The China-Africa relationship
has brought significant economic opportunities, but it has also generated controversy in the
international community. China has been challenged by some of forming a partnership with
African governments solely for China’s own interests. China provides low-interest loans to the
African governments for development and infrastructure projects. However, China’s motives are
exploitative as China uses economic and political pressures to influence African governments to
enter into agreements that are not in their best interests. The emergence of the global COVID-19
pandemic is a current factor in China-Africa relations, and China’s diplomacy.2 As China
continues to expand its economic ties in sub-Saharan Africa, evidence shows that China also
jeopardizes the economic development of countries in Africa and takes advantage of their natural
resources. Chinese-owned companies operating in Africa also lack transparency as Chineseowned companies fail to clearly state their polices in contracts on infrastructure development.3
This thesis is a study of the motives and impacts of China’s engagement with subSaharan Africa. It will review the history and the current discourse on China’s interests in the
region. A case study of China’s engagement with Zambia will be presented to illustrate the
significance of China’s engagement with African governments and their development interests.
Furthermore, this study will explore the China-Africa effect on the Zambian economy,
government policies, and investigate the global relevance of China's presence in Africa. This
study finds that China’s engagement with Zambia has led to aid dependency, fueled corruption,
and caused economic disparities. This research is significant in International Relations as it
contributes to the growing discourse regarding factors affecting economic growth in subSaharan Africa.
Keywords: China, Africa, Zambia, Africa-China Policy, Investment, Partner, Technology
Command, Industrialization, Digital Interdependence, Trade and Investments, Engagement
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Introduction
China’s political and trade involvement in African affairs dates to the early 1950s. The
Bandung Conference in 1955 was an historic meeting held as the world shifted into its postcolonial era, entered into the Cold War period, and witnessed the emergence of the Non-Aligned
Movement. During the meeting Premier Zhou Enlai relayed his support for solidarity with newly
independent countries and anti-colonialism. Premier Zhou Enlai later toured ten newly
independent African countries between 1963-1964 and articulated the "Five Principles
Governing the Development of Relations with Arab and African Countries" and "Eight
Principles for Economic Aid and Technical Assistance to other Countries.”4 The China-Africa
relationship was forged with the mutual understanding that China would provide African
governments with foreign aid and infrastructure development. While newly African governments
would provide China with natural resources..
In the 21st century, China-Africa relations have been further cemented as China continues to
be Africa’s biggest commercial partner and investor. Fifty-three out of fifty-four African
countries now maintain diplomatic ties and bilateral exchanges with China.5 In 2000, China
established the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) as a platform for dialogue to
coordinate and regulate political and economic activities. FOCAC was established as a “platform
for collective dialogue and an effective mechanism for enhancing practical cooperation between
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China and African countries.” It aims to “deepen mutual understanding, expand consensus,
strengthen friendship and promote cooperation through equal consultation.”6
In addition, various sub-forums have been established within the framework of FOCAC.
They include the China-Africa People’s Forum, China-Africa Young Leaders Forum, Ministerial
Forum on China-Africa Health Cooperation, China-Africa Poverty Reduction and Development
Conference, Forum on China-Africa Media Cooperation, FOCAC-Legal Forum, Forum on
China-Africa Local Government Cooperation, and China-Africa Think Tanks Forum.7
In 2006, a Chinese publication released an article entitled “China’s African Policy.”8 The
publication presented China’s strategic vision and strong interest in having continued relations
with Africa.9 The policy outlined China's goals and indicated that there would be an increase in
engagement with the continent. China's policy states that the relationship with China would
enhance African economies in exchange for access to natural resources and domestic markets.
Further analysis of the China-Africa relations reveals that this union is not a total "win-win"
situation. China's engagement and investments have had innumerable effects on African
countries. Although China has provided infrastructure and financial and technical assistance,
China’s participation has stifled Africa’s ability to produce manufactured goods and the loans
that China has provided have added to African countries’ debt problems.10 In efforts to improve
their economies, African countries have created strong ties with China, but at a cost. The World
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Bank reported that the continent’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita increased by 2.4%
between 2000-2009, with a growth rate of 1.8%. 11 Additionally, African governments have seen
improvements in institutions and infrastructure and productivity. Despite these benefits, this
relationship has been disadvantageous for some countries on the continent. Certain sub-Saharan
countries have experienced adverse effects in their economic environment, such as little
improvement in employment, and an underdevelopment of domestic small- and medium-sized
(SMEs) businesses. China’s demand for natural resources has concentrated their investments in
the extractive industries sector. Chinese-owned manufacturing firms have displaced African
firms that produce similar goods, threatening the African manufacturing sector.12 The
underdevelopment of these small businesses has thus then reduced employment opportunities
for locals.
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The present study focuses on China's global relevance and impacts in Africa. A case
study is presented to illustrate the complexity of China's effects on Zambia's economy, politics,
and policies. Through a qualitative approach method, secondary and primary data collection
from the World Bank, IMF (International Monetary Fund), Trading Economics, think tanks, and
literature, I argue that China’s engagement with Africa is exploitive rather than beneficial to
African countries and Chinese-owned companies operate with little corporate social
responsibility. This study contributes to the growing discourse about the factors affecting
economic growth in sub-Saharan Africa. It concludes with recommendations to African
governments to better increase their benefits from their relations with China through
transparency and reforms.
This argument will be presented in the following chapters: The second chapter is
dedicated to reviewing existing academic literature on the China-Africa relationship. Chapter
three focuses on the background of the bilateral relationship by investigating the historical
involvement, adopted foreign policy, and past and current foreign direct investment strategies.
Chapter four provides insight into the dynamics of China’s engagement with African
Organizations. Chapter five explores the Zambia-China interrelationship, the global relevance of
China in Zambia, and challenges that have arisen within this partnership. Chapter six discusses
the engagement in the context of national and international commitments to the AU Agenda
2063, Zambia’s National Development Plan, and commitments to the Sustainable Development
Goals (SDG). The concluding chapter summarizes findings, proposes challenges, and provides
recommendations.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
Africa’s representation and China’s motives for engagement as intertwined in modes of
interaction through aid, trade, and investment is explored by Oscar Otele, using three theoretical
perspectives: Realism, Social Constructivism, and Liberalism. These varied perspectives are
used to understand China’s relations with Africa. Realism views China’s engagement in Africa
as of national interest and economically driven. China is on the quest to gain access to natural
resources to maintain its own economic growth and sustain energy security, not unlike previous
European colonial powers. The relationship between the two is said to produce North-South
dependency because of the trade imbalance, and lack of sustainability. 13 China has been able to
obtain these natural resources by applying its five principles of peaceful coexistence. Otele
discloses that for China to secure trade links and foster an investment environment, China must
promote peace in Africa. Liberalism affirms that this relationship is an effect of globalization
rooted in China's domestic modernization program.
Through globalization, China has maintained its footing in Africa and has become the
continent’s leading lending partner. At the same time, African countries have adopted China’s
cultural diplomacy. African countries have seen a rise of Confucius institutes, African students in
China, leadership training for African politicians, media, academia, and civil society. 14 Social
constructivism views engagement as shaped by identities and shared interests over time. Chinese
actors, apart from the country of China, have interests in Africa as well. Otele’s analysis through
these three theoretical perspectives revealed that the China-Africa relationship has resulted in
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dependency on aid from China and development assistance as the continent has witnessed from
other countries.
This dependency theory on aid and development is a principal factor to consider in the
analysis of the relations between China and Africa. Dambisa Moyo scrutinized and revealed the
dangers of aid and development assistance in African countries. Moyo’s main claim was that aid
has failed to provide any economic growth and in fact, has contributed to poverty and corruption.
It encourages corruption and slows down economic growth.15 Aid reduces savings and
investments which leads to low tax revenue. 16 African countries that have received a great deal
of aid have not observed economic growth or poverty reduction. She states "Even the most
cursory look at data suggests that aid has increased over time, Africa's growth has decreased with
an accompanying higher incidence of poverty.... Sixty years, over the USD1 trillion of African
aid, and not much to show for it."17 Moyo claims that aid is a "silent killer of growth," that
contributes to corruption backed by data received from The World Bank. 18She outlines several
points to support her claim and the correlation between corruption and aid assistance. 19
With aid’s help, corruption fosters corruption; nations quickly descend into a vicious
cycle of aid. Foreign aid props up corrupt governments-providing them with freely
usable cash. These corrupt governments intervene with the rule of law, the
establishment of transparent civil institutions, and the protection of civil liberties,
making both domestic and foreign investment in poor countries unattractive.
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According to George Yu, African countries have been willing to accept aid and
development help from China because national development patterns do not produce rapid
economic growth. These patterns are based on Western models of development, growth, and
progress. China's development experience appeals to many African countries because China
began as an underdeveloped country, much like African countries today. 20 Yu provides this
context to explain the interests within the China-Africa relationship from both parties. China’s
main motive is to gain access to natural resources. A secondary motive is to weaken the political
alliances between African governments and the United States and Russia. Yu provides examples
of China’s manipulation of African countries by villainizing the US and Russia’s (formerly the
Soviet Union) joint actions in sending troops to suppress liberation movements following the
Democratic Republic of Congo’s independence from Belgian in 1960. China has also charged
Russia and the United States with trying to gain access to African natural wealth, promote
discrimination, and not supply support to Congo during political conflict with Belgian.21 Yu
concluded that the United States and Russia/Soviet Union’s policies were to protect national and
economic interests in Congo’s mineral wealth. 22
Larry Hanauer and Lyle Morris further analyze the interests of China and Africa. Similar
to other research, they note that that China’s overarching interests in Africa are (1) access to gas,
oil, and other natural resources for domestic industries, (2) access to African markets for exports,
(3.) promotion of South-South solidarity and expansion of private commercial activities.23
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Hanauer and Morris share the same rhetoric that Yu provided in his analysis in terms of why
Africa pursues a relationship with China. They note that African leaders interact with China and
want to have a relationship with China as previously interacted with Western countries.24 African
countries that are authoritarian and undemocratic especially aspire to replicate China's rapid
economic growth based on a state-centric economic model.
As China continues to pledge support for Africa’s economic development, selfdetermination, and improvement in the standards of living of African people, China’s trade
relations increase. Like the other analysts, Mohammed Marfa finds that Africa's business and
development relationship with China is intricately linked to the energy and natural resources
sectors, infrastructure projects, and small-scale investments.25 China has established trade
relationships with all African countries and set up more than 150 trading companies on the
continent. Mohammed explains that the relationship between China and Africa is mutual because
of the increased trade volume in Africa and the extraction of oil and other commodities by
China. Africa holds around 8% of the world's oil reserves and has 11% share of world oil
production.26 The relationship with China also provides opportunities and potential for the
development of African markets. These benefits, also come with costs. China has been accused
of promoting corruption in Africa and trading in ways that have damaged African anti-poverty
efforts. China’s presence presents a threat to traditional Western industrial dominance in the
region.27 Because many of China’s projects and ventures have been in the form of aid, grants,
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and loans, China’s investment strategy and business practices have contributed to rising
government corruption and leave a legacy of government incompetence.28
Renwick, Gu, and Hong examine China's role in the extractive industry in Africa and the
effects on governance by studying the case of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). China
is DRC’s main trading partner, but China takes advantage of DRC’s zinc, cooper, oil, and gas
sectors, and other commodities. Renwick, Gu, and Hong found that Chinese-owned companies
failed to provide adequate reporting in relation to extraction of natural resources in DRC. In
their research, Lawson-Remer and Greenstein stated: ‘Instead of creating prosperity, resources
have too often fostered corruption, undermined inclusive economic growth, incited armed
conflict and damaged the environment.”
The sentiment on aid by Mohammed Marfa is echoed in Johnathan Rosen's analysis of
China's engagement with Zambia. His research was based in part on interviews with Zambian
citizens about the relationship between Zambia and China. Marfa found that China’s engagement
with the Zambian government was reckless and a danger to Zambia’s sovereignty. One citizen
stated that “Chinese investment is benefiting individuals in the ruling party and not the general
citizens. China wants to lend but we’re getting into a situation where we won’t be able to pay
those debts off.” Locals complained that China brings inexpensive imports that are sold for
cheap and in turn disrupts the local markets. Rosen accuses China of building new infrastructure
but with hidden agendas. Chinese loans are said to be “highly addictive, readily available and
with long term negative effects that far outweigh any temporary high.”

28
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Zambia's relationship with China has yet to yield great developmental progress for the
country. Beuran, Raballanda, and Revilla examined how a middle-income country like Zambia
became a low-income country over the span of 40 years. They inspected the actual effects of
foreign aid in the country to determine whether it is the main cause of the decline in GDP per
capita. Zambia is characterized by elevated levels of poverty, unequal income distribution, and
an economy that is highly dependent on commodity exports. They cite that like many countries,
Zambia’s poor governance has resulted in uneven impacts of development assistance across the
country. Bad governance, high levels of political and petty corruption, general unaccountability
on the part of donors and recipients, poor management of aid mechanisms, and the inability to
establish private-sector stability are all contributing factors to the failure of government’s efforts
to reduce poverty and improve the standards of living for everyone in the country.

Beuran, Raballanda, and Revilla provide a vast amount of evidence to highlight the
correlation of aid per capita and GDP per capita. The results show that aid did not expand the
economy or reduce levels of corruption or improve the performance of the social sector. An
insightful part of the article provides several answers as to why aid had not been more effective
in Zambia. The authors concluded that:29
1. Recipients’ low quality of governance and inadequate oversight of public
spending reduce the impact of donor-funded programs
2. Donor’s overly ambitious or unrealistic plans to reduce poverty
3. Donors’ inadequate quantitative rigor sometimes produces inappropriate
strategies

29
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Chapter 3: China-Africa Relations Background

2.1 Historical Relations
China and Africa’s engagement began in April 1955 at the Bandung Conference of Non-Aligned
Nations. This conference hosted twenty-nine governments of Asian and African nations to
discuss peace, decolonization, and economic development. Many of the attendees' core agendas
were to eradicate colonialism, create a common front to protect sovereignty, and mitigate against
the effects of the Cold War. At this conference, the Chinese leader, Mao Zedong, actively
supported national independence movements in Africa.30 The conference established the
foundation for China-Africa relations. In 1956, Egypt emerged as the first African country to
establish diplomatic relations with China.31 In the 1970s, China financed and built the TanzaniaZambia Railway to aid in economic development and promote the easy flow of commodities.
The railway connected Zambia to the port of Dar es Salaam in Tanzania which eliminated
Zambia's economic dependence on the apartheid regimes of South Africa and Zimbabwe. To
finance this railway, the Chinese government provided a 400 million interest-free loan and
shipped materials worth 1 million to be used.32 The development of infrastructure by China was
a monumental event as it solidified the relationship and “friendship” between the two countries
and symbolized China’s support of African governments emerging from national liberation

30

The Bandung Conference was the first large-scale conference bringing together Asian and African states to
promote Afro-Asian cooperation and oppose colonialism. It was held in the Cold War context and laid the
foundations for the Non-Aligned Movement. Emma Mawdsley, “China and Africa: Emerging Challenges to the
Geographies of Power”, in Geography Compass, Vol. 1, No. 3
31
Times, Global. “Egypt and China: Historical Relationship into the Future.” Global Times, www.global
times.cn/content/1189854.shtml.
32
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the People's Republic of China. “China's Assistance in the Construction of the
Tanzania-Zambia Railway.” China's Assistance in the Construction of the Tanzania-Zambia Railway,
www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/ziliao_665539/3602_665543/3604_665547/t18009.shtml.
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movements. China’s continued expansion of bilateral relationships with African countries
resulted in mutual political support and economic cooperation.
In 1971, twenty-six African countries voted for the restoration of China’s permanent seat
in the United Nations and the removal of Taiwan as the representative of China.33 China later
renewed its interest in Africa after the end of the Cold War and following a decline in the
political and economic interest of African countries in the 1980s. In 1996, President Jian Zemin
toured six African countries and addressed the Organization of African Unity (OAU), presently
the African Union (AU). At this forum, Jian Zemin introduced a four-point proposal for
developing a cooperative relationship between Africa and China. In his proposal, he focused on
solidarity and cooperation, development, and mutual trust.34 China was invited back to the OAU
headquarters as a guest for the first time in 1998, and later in 2000 OAU Secretary-General
attended the Forum on China- Africa Cooperation (FOCAC).35 In 2006, a declaration and action
plan for 2007-2009 was adopted by China and Africa to confirm the establishment of a
partnership and an action plan that encompassed China-Africa cooperation.36 This action plan
proposed cooperation in the fields of economics, politics, social development, and international
affairs.
Through the last decade, China-Africa relations are the strongest they have ever been.
China has continued to provide an immense amount of aid and investment to North Africa and

33
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34
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35
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36
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Portal, Institute for Security Studies (ISS), 1 Dec. 2008, www.africaportal.org/publications/the-forum-on-chinaafrica-cooperation-a-strategic-opportunity/.
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sub-Saharan Africa. At the 2018 China-Africa Cooperation Forum, China announced it would be
providing USD60 billion in financial support to Africa. In 2018, the first forum on defense and
security was held to encourage cooperation, promote China-Africa peace and security, and
regional maritime security.

China has recognized the importance of its relationship with Africa in terms of its
position on Taiwan – that there is only one China, and that Taiwan is a province of China, not a
sovereign state. All Africa countries aside from Swaziland have pledged allegiance to China. In
2018, Burkina Faso re-established diplomatic ties with China, leaving Swaziland Taiwan’s last
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friend on the continent further bonding the China-Africa collaboration based on African support
for the “one-China principle” and the China-Africa policy.37
China is a global power and is on the track to be the world's next economic superpower.
China continues to shift, and change polices to foster economic and social development of the
country’s many allies. China’s Five–Year Plan (FYP) introduced in 2021 focuses on selfreliance, agricultural development, and environmental technology. The 14th Five-Year Plan
illustrates China's vision for social and economic development that will guide China's policies
from 2021 to 2025.38 This Five-Year plan's agenda emphasizes market system reform,
development of state ownership economy, and encompasses the dual circulation strategy. 39 The
dual circulation strategy (DCS) aims to expand China's domestic demand and develop its export
market at the same time. In utilizing DCS China intends to reduce its exposure to external market
conditions. China's focus in its 14th FYP is to advance its economy by revitalizing productivityled growth. 40
3.2 China-Africa Policy
The China-Africa policy is based on common fundamental interests, reciprocity, and
support. China's foreign policy safeguards its national independence and sovereignty. China
emphasizes diplomacy and desire to cultivate ties with major economic powers. The ChinaAfrica foreign policy is based on enhancing solidarity and cooperation and supporting
development. In 2006, China published a white paper on its African Policy. The “African Policy

37
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38
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40
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Paper” outlined China’s principals and intentions towards African countries. The intentions in
the China-Africa policy paper are as follows:41
•

•

•

•

Sincerity, friendship, and equality. China adheres to the Five Principles of Peaceful
Coexistence, respects African countries' independent choice of the road of development and
supports African countries' efforts to grow stronger through unity
Mutual benefit, reciprocity, and common prosperity. China supports African countries'
endeavors for economic development and nation-building, carries out cooperation in
various forms in the economic and social development, and promotes common prosperity of
China and Africa
Mutual support and close coordination. China will strengthen cooperation with Africa in the
United Nations and other multilateral systems by supporting each other's just demand and
reasonable propositions and continue to appeal to the international community to give more
attention to questions concerning peace and development in Africa
Learning from each other and seeking common development. China and Africa will learn
from and draw upon each other's experience in governance and development, strengthen
exchanges and cooperation in education, science, culture, and health. Supporting African
countries' efforts to enhance capacity building, China will work together with Africa in the
exploration of the road of sustainable development
China's objectives are to continue to strengthen and increase ties with Africa in a way that

is mutually beneficial. China will provide capital and technical assistance to develop
infrastructure while African countries in return provide political support in multilateral forums,
such as the United Nations, and access to natural resources. China's second African Policy
released in 2015 focused on defense, security, and military training programs. China's second
policy was expanded to include support for peacebuilding through development. The second
policy aims to deepen military cooperation and support Africa in confronting security threats.42

41

Ibid.
China's Second Africa Policy Paper,” Full Text: China's second Africa policy paper - World - Chinadaily.com.cn,
accessed May 2, 2021, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/XiattendsParisclimateconference/201512/05/content_22632874.htm.
42
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China has several government organs and agencies that are responsible for facilitating
China-Africa relations. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) carries out China's foreign policy
and represents the Chinese government's relations with foreign countries. This organ's main
function is to disseminate China's foreign policy documents and share significant statements
concerning international events; it plays a central role in shaping China's African policy. The
Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) coordinates the negotiation and implementation of bilateral
aid agreements, including loans and trade arrangements. The department in charge of aid to
Africa under the MOFCOM is the Department of Foreign Aid. In cooperation with MOFCOM,
the Ministry of Finance (MOF) manages the budgets for foreign aid expenditures.43 In 2018,
China established the China International Development Cooperation Agency (CIDCA) in efforts
to reform aid management and align China’s foreign policy to the aid agenda.44 The National
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) coordinates and manages resources acquisitions
and formulates trade and investment policies that are carried out by the Export-Import Bank of
China (China Exim Bank). The lending program supports China's foreign policy focus on
infrastructure investment and extractive industries. Exim reported in 2019 that China funded 46
African countries with USD87 billion dollars to support the economic and social benefits of
African countries. 45 It is the leading lender and finances the expansion of China-Africa trade and
investments in Africa.

43
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45
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3.3 China- Africa Investments
The Chinese government has been significantly involved in providing financial services
to facilitate trade and investment projects in Africa, surpassing comparable investments from the
U.S. 46 The level of investments increased to USD2.7 billion dollars in 2019 which is an increase
from the USD75 million dollars invested in 2003.47
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According to the World Bank China receives 16% of Africa’s exports and 14 to 21% of
resource imports. The China - Africa Development Bank (CADFund) and China Exim Bank are
responsible for investment lending. Operated by the China Development Bank, the CADFund
was established in 2006 as China’s first private equity fund that focused on investing in Africa.48
It is one of the eight measures for China-Africa cooperation announced at the FOCAC. The
investments within the CADFund are dedicated to infrastructure development, natural resources
exploration, agriculture, energy, and manufacturing. 49 The CADFund utilizes these four main
investment approaches to promote China-Africa relations:50
1. Equity investment- offers encouragement for Chinese enterprises to conduct economic and
trade activities.
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2. Quasi-equity investment- CADFund has the authority to invest in China's state policy.
Investment can be in the form of stock, capital, and hybrid capital instruments and
convertible bonds.
3. Fund investment- the CADFund can invest, as a “fund of funds,” a rational proportion of its
capital in other funds that invest in African countries.
4. CADFund can provide knowledge investment in the form of consulting, management,
consulting, and financial advisory.
In 2008, the CADFund supported six investment projects in Africa worth USD90 million.
As of 2012, the fund has supported 60 projects across the African continent. The Fund has
invested in cotton cultivation projects in Malawi, Mozambique, and Zambia; power plant
development in Ghana, and investment in Ethiopia’s leather, cement, and glass production.51 The
Fund’s main criteria for approving project lending is that the projects have a great return on
investment or facilitate economic growth in the country. These criteria reveal two things: 1) the
CADFund favors Chinese partners as opposed to African partners, and 2) the fund is created to
promote Chinese interests. Another challenge in addition to the exclusion of African-owned
enterprises and partners is the lack of transparency in reporting. Grimm and Schickerling
disclose in their analysis of the CADFund that data about project funding and investments are
not easily found. Increasing the level of transparency would improve the efficiency of the
CADFund.52
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Chinese aid and investments are extremely attractive to African government leaders. This
is because of China’s repayment flexibility, conditionality, and debt relief aid. China provides
Africa with considerable financial support in the form of grants, loans, and private investment.
These loans often lack conditions and limitations, making it easier for African governments to
receive the aid unlike that of the IMF, World Bank, and other lenders.53 The debt relief feature
makes China a more attractive lender. China has forgiven and allowed many African countries to
default on or delay the repayment of loans. According to the China-Africa Research initiative,
between 2000 and 2019, China had written off loans worth USD3.4 billion dollars and did not
pursue litigation against countries that defaulted.54 Data from the World Bank in 2018 found that
Chinese official lenders accounted for 21% of debt in 38 African countries.
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3.4 Extractive Industries
One of China’s main motives for maintaining a relationship with Africa, is access to
strategic natural resources.55 Materials such as iron, copper, zinc, magnesium, cobalt, uranium,
and gold have been of particular interest to Chinese investors.56 China has expanded its
dominance in the mining sector, not unlike Western governments and private companies in the
colonial era. Between 2006 and 2017, mining investments in sub-Saharan Africa were at USD33
billion. In 2010, China produced several mines in South Africa, Zambia, Zimbabwe, DRC, and
Ghana. One of China's main interests in Zambia and the DRC was the extraction of copper and
cobalt, as these countries are among the leading repositories of these critical minerals.
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In 2018, the Chinese government controlled 28% of copper production in Zambia and
over 50% of cobalt production in the DRC.57 Chinese-owned companies in Africa are
continuously attempting to expand and maintain control over operations in mineral productions.
Most of the Chinese controlled operations are often sold to other Chinese companies, thus
preventing African companies from gaining access to these investment opportunities. This
creates a cycle that results in China benefiting more and maintaining its share of control over
mineral production. China's control over global and African mining can be observed through
ownership of mines, management, and long-term contracts.58 These mining companies may be
privately operated, but their activities are directed by the Chinese government. 59
China's control over Africa's mining sector is one issue in the extraction of resources.
Another issue is found in the reluctance to report extraction activity to the Extractive Industries
Transparency Initiative (EITI). 60 EITI is an accountability management tool used to monitor the
extraction of oil, gas, and mineral resources. It is an international initiative that requires
governments to disclose information regarding resource extraction. In doing so, it aims to
strengthen government and private sector systems. Implementing countries must meet the
requirements of transparency and accountability that are set out in the EITI Standard. The EITI’s
requirements are minimal.61 Implementing countries must disclose any and all contracts and
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licenses. Chinese companies operating in implementing countries are required to disclose all
information on mining production contracts, revenues, and licensing agreements. The EITI
Standard requires reporting of misconduct and aims to “curb corruption, strengthen governance
and support inclusive development.”
The EITI has reported China’s lack of transparency and discourse in Chad and the
Democratic Republic of Congo. In Chad, China delayed EITI reporting because of the lack of
audited accounts. China’s lack of comprehensiveness and unreliability in reporting in 2013
resulted in the suspension of DRC from the EITI. 62 Although China reports to the EITI and
discloses payments, China does not implement the EITI. China not implementing the EITI
standards means that their reporting is not mandatory, and ultimately China can decide to
withhold information about the type and quantity of extractions made in a given country.

3.5 Coronavirus Pandemic and Global Health Diplomacy
In 2019, the emergence of the coronavirus (COVID-19) in the city of Wuhan provided
an opportunity for China to further cement relations with African governments. The deadly virus
has caused large scale illnesses and fatalities across the African continent. As of June 2021,
5,189, 000 people in Africa have been infected and 136,000 have died as a result of the COVID19 pandemic.63 The Chinese government and Chinese companies have provided aid to African
governments by providing face masks, testing kits, medical equipment, and other personal
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protection equipment (PPE).64 The Chinese government has sent medical teams and doctors to
aid in the prevention of the spread of the disease.65 China’s health diplomacy has significantly
expanded. The Chinese government has provided half a billion doses of vaccines to 45 African
countries.66 Additionally, China agreed to suspend principal and interest payments of debt to
African countries in 2020 during the G20 Debt Service Suspension Initiative.67 Because of this,
40 countries in sub-Saharan Africa were eligible to receive debt relief and forgo payments.
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Chapter 4: China and African Organizations
4.1 The African Union
China has maintained affiliations with Africa through collaboration with African
organizations such as the African Union and the Southern African Development Community.
The African Union (AU) was established in 2001 after succeeding the Organization for African
Unity (OAU). The OAU was established in 1963 post-Cold War era to address the growing need
for support and intervention of African countries. The organization was composed of the Council
of Ministers, Assembly of Heads of State and Government, General Secretariat and the
Commission of Mediation, and Conciliation and Arbitration. The African Union was established
to propel and further the aim of the OAU in relation to sovereignty, independence, peace, and
security. Today, the AU consists of 55 member states, and their work is implemented through
The Assembly of Heads of State and Government, the Executive Council, the Permanent
Representatives Committee (PRC), Specialized Technical Committees (STCs), the Peace and
Security Council, and The African Union Commission.68
Overall, the AU is a crucial factor in African affairs that promotes cooperation,
integration, and development. It is no surprise that China has partnered with the AU as described
in their China Africa policy. China has presently increased its economic, military corporation,
and political ties with the African Union. There has been a growing consensus among observers
that China has several interests in expanding relations with member states of the African Union.
China’s main interests in relations with the AU include garnering Africa’s support for the One
China Policy and other interests in international fora such as the UN; their access to natural
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resources and markets for exports; security interests in protecting their investments on the
continent, including peacekeeping missions; and lastly in promoting their alternative governance
model – a state-centric economic and non-democratic model.
In 2012, China donated USD200 million towards the construction of the new AU
headquarters in Addis Ababa.69 This is China’s largest aid project in Africa since the
construction of the TAZARA railway. China said that the donation was a gift from the people of
China to Africa and demonstrations continued support for Africa’s development and
sustainability. According to China’s senior political advisor, Jia Qingin, “the towering complex
speaks volumes about our friendship to the African people and testifies to our strong resolve to
support African development.” 70 The relationship between the AU and China has become closer
in the last few years. China views the AU as a stabilizing force in Africa that will help to protect
Chinese security interests. China supports the positive role that the AU plays in promoting peace
and security in the region.71 China has diligently worked with the AU on Peace and Security
Council (PSC) on promoting peace and security. China has shown its support for peace and
security in the continent by donating 10 million AU military grants in 2011 and 2010 and
contributing to the AU Secretary General’s 2019 Action of peacekeeping initiative in 2018. 72
China’s African Policy disclosed support for the AU leadership, stating:73
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China values and supports the AU's leadership in building a united and strong Africa and
promoting African integration, its centrality in safeguarding peace and security in Africa,
as well as a bigger role for the organization in regional and international affairs. It
appreciates and supports the AU's adoption and implementation of Agenda 2063 and its
first 10-year plan. The creation of the Mission of the People's Republic of China to the
AU in 2014 has taken China-AU relations to a new stage. China is ready to increase
high-level exchanges with the AU, give full play to the China-AU strategic dialogue
mechanism, and enhance political dialogue and mutual trust. It will promote cooperation
with the AU in areas such as development planning, experience sharing in poverty
reduction, health, peace and security, and international affairs.
In 2020, China increased its support for peace and security in Africa by providing
donations to African Union for equipment and training services specifically aimed at combatting
armed terrorist groups in the Sahel. There have also been AU—China agreements for military
equipment to enhance the capacity of the African Standby Force (ASF) that counters terrorism.
The relationship between the AU and China has been mostly beneficial but security
breaches have occurred between the two. Chinese networks have been known to electronically
infiltrate key communication channels in Africa. The French newspaper Le Monde reported in
2018 that China had hacked into the servers of the AU headquarters and stolen confidential data.
Another cybersecurity alert in 2020 notified the AU that another hacking by a Chinese hacking
group had occurred. China denied the allegations and alleged that this was a false narrative
promoted to shake the African- China relationship.74 This recent hacking incident is relevant in
the China-Africa relations as it highlights the threat that China is to Africa. The AU failed to deal
with China regarding cybersecurity issues.
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4.2 The Southern African Development Community
The Southern African Development Community (SADC) organization was established in
1992 as the successor of the Southern African Development Coordinating Conference (SADCC)
through the SADC treaty. 75The Organization’s main goals are to achieve peace and security,
promote economic growth and integration, and enhance the standard of life of Southern African
countries. China has recognized SADC's missions and have maintained a cooperation agreement
with the organization and its member states. Trade between the two exceeded USD100 billion in
2016 according to the SADC website and infrastructure development plans have been shared
with Chinese Investors. In 2015, SADC and China held an Infrastructure Seminar in Beijing to
discuss water, energy, and transport. 76 The Chinese government displayed their solidarity with
SADC region following the outbreak of COVID-19 by providing medical supplies and sending
Chinese medical experts to African countries. China has aligned itself with these two
organizations in order to deepen its relationships with African governments, to gain insights into
developments, investment opportunities, and political legitimacy.
China is a global power and is on track to be the world's next economic superpower.
China has allies all over the globe and continues to shift and change its policies to foster
economic and social development of its allies and partners. China has adopted a new Five-Year
Plan’s (FYP) that is focused on scientific self-reliance and prioritizes agriculture, finance, and
environmental technologies. This 14th Five-Year Plan illustrates China's vision for social and
economic development that will guide China's policies from 2021 to 2025. 77 The plan does not
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contain a growth target, unlike China's other five-year plans. This Five-Year Plan’s agenda
emphasizes market system reform, the development of the state ownership economy, and the
dual circulation strategy (DCS).78 The dual circulation strategy has two objectives: it aims to
expand China's domestic demand for goods and services and continues to develop its export
market. In utilizing DCS China wishes to reduce its exposure to external market conditions.
China's focus in its 14th FYP is to advance its economy by revitalizing productivity growth. The
Chinese government seeks to expand its economy and create a demand in Africa for goods
produced in China. This would thus negatively impact the growth of the manufacturing sector in
Africa which is a goal for the AU under the AU’s Agenda 2063. 79 Agenda 2063 aims to
accelerate the growth of African countries through “industrialization, import substitution, and
employment.” 80 China’s expansion into the continent will have a negative impact on African
countries industrialization growth and block the goals of the new Continental Free Trade
agreement that has projected an increase of output from Africa by USD1 trillion by 2025. 81
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Chapter 5: Zambia-China Relations: Case Study
5.1 Zambian History

Zambia’s colonization began in the 1890s through deceitful negotiations between
Zambian officials, and the British South Africa Company (BSAC). Through this negotiation,
BSAC was able to secure mineral rights to Zambia’s natural resources, copper, and lead. The
British later acquired Zambian land and became a British Protectorate in 1899. 82 Prior to British
control, Zambia was one of the leading producers of copper in the world after the Democratic
Republic of the Congo and was a country expected to be one of the leading economies in Africa,
but that is not the case today. Today, the country ranks among the countries with the highest
levels of poverty and inequality globally
Landlocked Zambia became independent of the British rule in 1964; the first government
was led by Kenneth Kaunda and the United National Independence Party (UNIP).83 The country
faced geographical barriers that negatively affected the global economy. Post colonialism, the
Zambian government had grand aspirations for the county’s economic growth, poverty
eradication, and nation building. Despite gaining independence and having an abundance of
natural resources, the country has failed to meet goals set post colonialism. Kenneth Kaunda
served as Zambia’s first president from 1964 to 1991. Prior to becoming President, Kaunda was
active in civil rights and participated in anti-colonial organizations. He helped established the
African National Congress (ANC) but later left to establish the Zambian African National
Congress (ZANC) to promote rights for Africans. Kaunda later become the member of the
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United National Independence Party (UNIP) and was elected as President. During his
presidency, Kaunda adopted new polices and developed a nationalist-socialist ideology. He was
a proponent of a one-party state and was interested in the socialist model of economic
development. In 1968, Kaunda introduced the Mulungushi Reforms to acquire shares in foreignowned firms in order to boost the economy. The reforms emphasized the Zambian governments
interests on political self-determination and economic self- reliance through the nationalization
of mining companies. Kaunda acquired and consolidated shares in Anglo America Corporation
and the Rhodesia Selection Trust, renaming it Nchanga consolidated Copper Mines (NCCM).
Kaunda also implemented polices to improve education levels in Zambia. In 1991 the Zambian
government shifted from a one-party rule to a multiparty democracy and elected Frederick
Chiluba as the next President. Today, the main political parties are Patriotic Front (PF),
Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD), and United Party for National Development
(UPND). Zambia’s ruling class was fragmented and fractured, composed of interest groups and
politicians.84 Zambia Inherited a dualistic economy that was heavily dependent on the mining
and on the agricultural sector.
After 1970, Zambia’s economy and development was negatively affected by the first oil
crisis and economic recession. In 1973, oil prices significantly increased, and the demand for
copper fell by 40% in 1975 and then again in 1979. The copper crisis caused closures of mining
operations and created massive unemployment.85 This crisis revealed Zambia’s extreme
dependence on cooper and natural resources. 86 The subsequent economic crisis led to Zambia
acquiring loans from the IMF and World bank because the foreign exchange reserves and
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government revenue drastically fell. This development was the beginning of an ongoing debt
cycle. Within a generation, Zambia transformed from being projected as one of Africa’s richest
to poorest. The national development plan strategies of the government immediately following
independency left a lasting impact on Zambia and its people. Andersson, Per-Åke, et. al., note
these as being the legacies left by colonial powers in Zambia: 87
1. A technologically advanced mining sector was developed into the mainstay of the
economy, thereby laying the ground for an almost irreversible external dependence. And
since mining uses capital-intensive techniques, the sector could not be relied on to
generate the employment that the country yearned for.
2. Traditional agriculture was marginalized by a combination of taxation and
agricultural policies, which were tilted in favor of expatriate farmers and the mining
industry (Luchembe, 1974, Dodge, 1977).
3. Economic activity was concentrated in the ‘line-of-rail’ provinces, laying the ground
for vast regional inequalities after independence.
4. At independence, the wage structures were characterized by huge differentials, and
income disparities continued to flourish.
5. African education and other social infrastructure were neglected.

The agricultural and industrial mining sectors are the backbone of Zambia’s economy. These
sectors employ most of the workforce and fuel the stagnant economy.
Today, Zambia’s economy has been burdened by debt, high inflation, and gross
depreciation. A 2019 Debt Sustainability Analysis by the International Development Association
and the International Monetary Fund reported that Zambia’s borrowing had increased
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significantly between 2008 and 2018, tripling the GDP.88 Zambia’s debt is estimated to have
reached USD12 billion dollars (51% of GDP) in 2018.89 The report noted that the country’s
public debt under current polices are on an unsustainable path, elevating the risk of debt distress.
According to the World Bank, Zambia’s economic performance has stalled since achieving
middle-income status in 2011. The average gross domestic product (GDP) between 2000 and
2014 averaged at 6.8%.90 A decline in copper prices; unsustainable fiscal policies; low
manufacturing/mining output; low agricultural productivity (because of droughts, low levels of
mechanization and limited access to agricultural finance); and the coronavirus pandemic
(COVID-19) resulted in the decline of the GDP growth rate to1.4%. 91 Because of these factors,
Zambia experienced a deep recession in 2020 since its first recession due to copper prices in
1998. The African Development Bank Group reported that the COVID-19 pandemic resulted in
the rising of inflation by 17.4% in 2020 and expansion of fiscal deficits (8.3% of GDP in 2019
and 11% of GDP in 2020). 92 COVID-19 not only had a great impact on Zambia’s economy, but
it also increased poverty levels and increased poverty gaps. An analysis by Boban Varghese
Paul et al found that poverty rates had increased by 1.8% in 2020 due to COVID-19 and had
increased by 1.4% the prior year due to low agricultural production as a result of persistent
droughts.
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COVID-19 has worsened Zambia’s critical economic situation. In 2020, Zambia became
the first country to default on a USD42.5 billion Eurobond during the pandemic and has missed
its USD56.1 million repayment in 2021.93 Before the default, the country had suspended debt
service payments to private sector creditors, citing economic challenges. The Zambian
government has taken and continued to take out massive loans for infrastructure projects. Since
2014, the Zambian government has acquired loans for 19 infrastructure projects, one massive
and impractically project being the Levy Mwanawasa football Stadium in Ndola.94Zambia has
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attempted to restore its economy and government, but remain shackled because of poor
governance, lack of infrastructure, aid dependency, and debt. The Zambian government has
negotiated and signed loan agreements for projects and also for budget support to run the
country. Zambia's post-colonial economy has unfortunately worsened over time as Zambia fails
to diversify the economy, shrink cooper reliance, and refrain from excessive borrowing.
Zambia’s links with China blossomed under Zambia's first president, Kenneth Kaunda.
Kaunda supported the two countries' relations and thought that ties with China would help with
development. The Tanzania-Zambia Railway Authority (TAZARA) railway was a major
development project lead by China and signified the relationship between China and Zambia. 95
The 1,860km railway helped landlocked Zambia create alternate trade routes by sea away from
apartheid regimes in South Africa and Rhodesia. The route ran from Dar es Salaam, in Tanzania,
through the Indian Ocean to Kpiri Mposhi that links to Copperbelt in Zambia. The railway
eliminated Zambia’s economic dependence and positively stimulated its economy.96 The railway
has become a symbol for China’s solidarity and support for African development. The
USD400m loan that China provided Zambia was never serviced and transformed into a grant.
China’s leniency towards Zambia not repaying loans acquired was more symbolic than was it a
favor. It was to make China appear as trusted and reliable partners, but this is a guise used to
make Zambian officials more willing to provide access to natural resources.
5.2 Resource Access
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China is a resource-poor country that relies on resource-rich countries like Zambia to
provide oil and natural gas resources. In 2011, Zambia opened the Zambia-China Economic and
Trade Cooperation Zone (ZCCZ), the first multi-facility zone with China. The ZCCZ was the
first overseas economic and trade cooperation zone between China and an Africa country. For
Zambian, the ZCCZ was an opportunity to boost economic activity, create employment
opportunities and secure financing for infrastructure projects. For China, however, this
agreement was not aimed primarily to support the development of the country; it was aimed at
expanding the market for Chinese goods and services and expanding access to strategic natural
resources. A robust relationship between the two countries is not surprising as China is the
world’s largest consumer of copper and Zambia is the worlds' second-largest producer of copper.
The China and Zambia trade relations are defined by mineral exports and the import of
finished goods from China. China’s switch to renewable energy systems is expected to further
expand the demand for copper. According to the United Nations Comtrade database, Zambia
exported USD1.39 billion worth of copper to China during 2020. China’s ambitious electric
vehicle manufacturing interests is expected to increase the demand for copper.97 Mining
comprises account for over 88% of China’s total investment in Zambia. Chinese mining
companies have been investing in Zambia since 1920. There are currently ten Chinese-owned
mines in Zambia, the largest being Chambishi Metals.98 China acquired Chambishi Metals from
the China Nonferrous Metal Mining company when copper prices were low. This purchase
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lacked transparency and legitimacy as negotiations were in secret and “few strings attached”
agreements were not shared with the Zambian government.99

5.3 China’s “Dead Aid”
China has offered Zambia a combination of interest-free and soft loans, grants, and credit
lines. China is Zambia’s biggest creditor, and China provides vast amounts of finance for
development. China’s participation in Zambia’s economy consists of loans and grants which are
often linked to Chinese commercial interests. China’s terms are not always transparent in terms
of interest rates and repayment dates. China is Zambia's preferred lender due to its repayment
leniency and development assistance package. Zambia has a history of failed repayments and
poor debt management. Zambia's debt is highly unsustainable and currently owes China USD3
billion, this does not factor in aid for infrastructure projects and social programs. Zambia is
described as a country with an "elevated risk of debt distress" as Zambia continue to borrow
despite having massive debt tabs.100 Zambia’s loans and aid have been provided by multilateral
banks like the World Bank, IMF, African Development Bank, commercial Eurobond market, and
China. Out of Zambia's USD12 billion external debts, 44% is China’s debt, the main creditor
being the China Exim bank.101 China has been accused of practicing “debt trap diplomacy” as
China continues to lend money to Zambia, despite Zambia being at high risk of debt distress.102
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Zambia has applied for debt relief from the IMF but continues to obtain aid from
China.103 In 2005, Zambia benefited from the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) debt relief
program of the World Bank and the IMF. The HIPC canceled all of Zambia’s debts but did not
stop the cycle of debt accumulation. Zambia is rapidly accumulating debt and yields little to no
benefits from its investments. Debt sustainability has become an issue because of the sheer scale
of Chinese loans posing a risk for projects to fail and funds to be misused. As Zambia counties to
borrow from China, funds are allocated to unnecessary projects. The Zambia government has
become so reliant on aid from China. Members of Zambia’s Patriot Front (PF) are supportive of
China’s investments and aid since China assists in the fulfillment of campaign promises and
other unreasonable costs. This relationship has continued to add to Zambia’s debt issues but also
has aided in the expansion of corruption. In 2017, the Zambian parliament purchased 42 fire
trucks that were alleged to cost USD42 million. This transaction led to the eruption of protests
citing the purchase was a result of corruption and misappropriation and abuse of public funds as
this could have been attributed to the country's health, education, the standard of living. Foreign
aid props up corrupt governments, like the Zambian government, with freely unrestricted cash
and this then intervenes in economic development as funds are diverted from legitimate
development purpose. 104 China’s grant aid to Zambia and infrastructure development have
contributed to the increase in levels of corruption and misuse of funds.
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5.4 Infrastructure Development
China has provided billions of US dollars of loans for infrastructure projects to many subSaharan African nations as part of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) that is also called the New
Silk Road. The BRI was established by President Xi Jinping in 2013 to expand China’s
economic and political influence and promote infrastructure development in Africa and
neighboring Asian countries. China’s economic vision emphasizes the importance of
globalization, trade, infrastructure investment and a win-win cooperation in achieving high levels
of economic development.
The BRI is a network of railways and energy pipelines that will streamline border
crossings and would expand international connectivity.105 From 2014 through 2017, more than
sixty countries have signed on to the initiative and have used loans from China to develop
highways, roads, railroads, and factories. At the Belt and Road Forum in 2017 President Xi
discussed the importance of infrastructure and connectivity by noting:106
Infrastructure connectivity is the foundation of development through cooperation. We
should promote land, maritime, air, and cyberspace connectivity, concentrate our efforts
on key passageways, cities, and projects and connect networks of highways, railways,
and seaports…. We need to seize opportunities presented by the new round of change in
the energy mix and the revolution in energy technologies to develop global energy
interconnection and achieve green and low-carbon development. We should improve the
trans-regional logistics network and promote connectivity of policies, rules, and
standards to provide institutional safeguards for enhancing connectivity.
The BRI projects are built using low-interest loans. These loans have added to the
accumulation of debt by African countries. Overall, the BRI includes several investments in
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railroads, gas and oil pipelines, ports, and economic corridors. The Council on Foreign Relations
reported that more than 60 countries, representing two-thirds of the world’s population have
indicated an interest in participating in the BRI.107 It’s estimated that China’s overall expenses
for the BRI could reach u to USD1.3 trillion by 2027.108 Zambia has been a significant recipient
and participant of China’s BRI. Over 50 of the country’s infrastructure projects have been
financed by China as part of Beijing’s Belt and Road initiative. Zambia's infrastructure projects
include hospitals, roads, public buildings, and water supply developments. These developments
have been financed by grants and interest-free loans. Although these developments are beneficial
in further developing Zambia, they do not increase employment opportunities or generate tax
revenue. According to the World Bank, the BRI also poses a debt sustainability risk. Chineseowned companies ensnare Zambia and other countries with loans that cannot necessarily be paid
back.109 In doing so, China increases leverage, expands its economic agendas, and its political
influence. China's BRI places Zambia more in debt and leaves Zambia with no control over
resources and mining operations. There is a danger that China could seize Zambian infrastructure
assets if the government fails to repay the loans.
In aiding Zambia in developing its infrastructure, China is also greatly benefiting.
Chinese-owned companies use their own labor and expand local markets for Chinese goods
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China continues to build these projects on build-operate-transfer (BOT) models. These models
allow China to have joint management and part ownership in the infrastructure that is being
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developed until the loan has been repaid. This is the case in airport construction and
telecommunications sector of the Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation (ZNBC). Although
infrastructure is developed with the aid of Chinese-owned companies, these companies use their
own equipment and employ their own laborers. This infrastructure development thus does not
transfer any skills to locals nor does not provide the opportunity for Zambian locals to get jobs.

5.5 Labor and Chinese Workers
The migration of Chinese nationals into Zambia can be attributed to China’s
infrastructure development in Zambia. There has been an increased in the number of Chinese
laborers, government officials, and experts that have migrated to Zambia over the last decade.
These workers have migrated due to the expansion of infrastructure in Zambia and the
development of strong economic ties between Zambia and China. In addition, other Chinese
nationals set up small business to take advantage of the large Chinese labor force. It was
estimated in 2019 by the United Nations that 80,000 Chinese nationals now live in Zambia.111
This great influx has resulted in Chinese workers competing with Zambians for low- and midlevel jobs. Many Zambians have been laid off and Chinese workers are hired to work on Chinarun projects.112 Chinese companies claim that the exclusion of local workers is because of
language barriers and cultural differences. Chinese employers lacked willingness and openness
to learn about Zambian culture, customs, and languages. Investments in Zambia’s mines have
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opened new ventures and employment, but it has come with several complaints from miners
working in Chinese copper companies. 113
Since 2003, Chinese workers have been migrating to the country, taking jobs, and
creating their own mining companies.114 The late President Michael Sata of Zambia was a great
skeptic of China and its nationals. In his 2006 pursuit of re-election, he called the Chinese
”infesters” instead of investors and claimed that Chinese-owned companies were taking jobs
away from local Zambians. His Anti-China rhetoric was motivated by accounts of abuse and
discrimination that had been reported by Zambians.
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According to a Human Rights Watch report, Chinese copper industry owners regularly
violate the rights of Zambia employees. The report noted that owners do not provide working
gear that ensures safe working conditions and often have Zambian workers working 12-18 hours
shifts under extreme heat. Workers were not given face masks, safety shoes, or proper work
uniforms.115. Chinese companies and Zambian workers have had years of conflict. In 2005, 52
Zambian workers perished because of the lack of safety practices at the Chambeshi explosive
factory. In 2010, Chinese managers opened fire on protesting workers, and later another shooting
occurred in 2011. Zambian miners at the Collum Coal Mine protested unfair wages and poor
working conditions. Workers felt neglected by Chinese management. This protest resulted in
deaths of Zambian mine workers and the injury of Chinese workers. Major disagreements
occurred in 2017 and 2018 regarding fair compensation, illegal mining, and hazardous working
conditions.116
Chinese workers have also been employed as police officers. In 2017, eight Chinese were
recruited to be officers in the Zambian police force. This caused major backlash and widespread
anger from citizens as Zambia had imposed laws that banned police officers from marrying
foreigners and restricting Zambians with dual nationality to join the police.117. This employment
was later absolved because of the major backlash. Although Chinese investments have created
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jobs in Zambia; these jobs are given to Chinese migrants instead of the locals. This has resulted
in the increase of Zambia’s unemployment rate to 13.20% in 2019 from an 11.40 % in 2018.

5.6 Telecommunications Expansions
China’s role has begun to expand through Zambia and the rest of Africa, even in the
telecommunications realm in Zambia. In 2017, China agreed to partner with Zambia National
Broadcasting (ZNBC) and China’s digital television service provider Top Star Communications.
Top Star communications presented a 25-year contract in which China took a 60% stake in
ZNBC. This deal empowers the company to collect all ZNBC advertising and tower rental
revenue for the next 25 years. In this “merger” Top Star allows ZNBC to collect revenue but the
collected revenue will go to servicing a loan secured by the Zambian government from the
Export-Import Bank.
In 2020, Zambia announced that China established a contract between Zambia’s
electricity company ZESCO signed contracts worth USD548 million dollars with Power China.
Power China aided Zambia’s power deficit by developing three solar plants and by diversifying
Zambia’s renewable energy sector.118 China’s expansion into the telecommunications and energy
sectors is important as it reflects the commitment of the long-term relationship with Zambia.
There is a danger in the hegemon, that is China and Chinese investors, having a higher stake in
Zambia's telecommunications and a contract with Zambia’s power supply that gives them a
controlling interest.
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The China-Africa economic relations may be beneficial for both parties, however, taking
into consideration this analysis, there is a significant economic imbalance in the level of benefit
and control over the development processes.
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Chapter 6: Africa’s Sustainable Development Goals

6.1 Zambia's National Economic Development Plan

The Seventh National Development Plan (7NDP) is Zambia's development framework
for the next five years under President Edgar Lungu.119 It departs from sectoral-based planning to
an integrated (multi-sectoral) development approach under the theme "Accelerating development
efforts towards the Vision 2030 without leaving anyone behind." The plan outlines the
government's desired development outcomes as well as accompanying strategies and programs
for the country. Vision 2030 is the plan that expresses the Zambian government’s aspirations in
improving the country.120 The goal of the 7NDP is to create a diversified and resilient economy
for sustained growth and socio-economic transformation driven, among others, by agriculture,
tourism, manufacturing, and mining. It is in support of the United Nations 2030 Agenda for
Sustainable Development and the African Union Agenda 2063. The Zambian government hopes
that this plan yields economic diversification and job creation; poverty and vulnerability
reduction; reduced developmental inequalities; enhanced human development; and an enhanced
governance environment for a diversified and inclusive economy.121
The plan reveals that the Zambian government must make policy shifts for the country to
achieve its objectives of vision 2030. Achieving these objectives will aid the Zambian
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government in diversifying their economy and achieving the status of a middle-income country
(MIC).
6.2 Agenda 2063
The African Union's “Agenda 2063 The Africa We Want” is the continent’s strategic
framework for growth and sustainable development. The agenda was adopted by the AU in 2015
as an agreement for the continent and outlined political and socioeconomic aspirations. It is the
AU’s roadmap for economic development, peace, prosperity, aspirations for the future, and
identifies programs that can boost Africa's economy. Agenda 2063 identifies activities in a10year implementation plan over the 50 years that will ensure that Agenda 2063 delivers
transformation and results for all African Countries. It prioritizes Africa's sustainable
development, governance, respect for human rights, justice, and law, in peace and security. 122
Goals include a higher standard of living for citizens; access to education; the promotion of
health and wellness; transformed economies; increased productivity and production in
agriculture; environmentally sustainable and climate-resilient economies and communities; the
stabilization of Africa in terms of peace and security; full gender equality; and promotion.
Agenda 2063's aspirations include:123
1. A prosperous Africa based on inclusive growth and sustainable development
2. An integrated continent politically united and based on the ideals of Pan- Africanism
and the vision of Africa's Renaissance
3. An Africa of good governance, democracy, respect for human rights, justice, and the
rule of law
4. A peaceful and secure Africa
5. An Africa with a strong cultural identity, common heritage, shared values, and ethics
6. An Africa where whose development is people-driven, relying on the potential of
African people, especially its women and youth, and caring for children
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7. Africa as a strong, united, resilient, and influential global player and partner The
African Union proposes that through domestication, and polarization they will be
able to provide development and socio-economic transformation to the continent.

The Chinese government has remained committed to the AU and to the vision of Agenda
2063 through infrastructure investment opportunities such as the Belt and Road Initiative. The
multi-billion-dollar infrastructure investment platform demonstrates China’s support of
sustainable development goals in Africa as construction covers economic and trade cooperation,
resource development, industrialization, and infrastructure development. 124 China has built more
than 6,000 kilometers of railways and highways, 20 trade ports, and more than 80 power
facilities in Africa.125
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Chapter 7: Conclusion and Recommendations
7.1 Recommendations
China’s motives have led to China as a contributor to Africa’s underdevelopment while also
producing positive development. Most African countries view China as being economically
strategic and as offering a development model of “state capitalism” that can be replicated in
Africa. African countries have continued bilateral relationships with China because China is
viewed to be a favorable partner in terms of influence and contributions to development. The
case study of the role that China plays in Zambian development demonstrates that Zambia has
become dependent on infrastructure financing and other forms of aid from China and failed to
manage its own national policies in engaging with China. For its part, China as a superpower
has failed to adhere to its stated commitments to assist economic development and
industrialization in Africa.
The Zambian government must better understand how to allocate aid - both grant aid and
concessional loans - and not carelessly use the national budget. Financial assistance that is
received from China is not well allocated and understood in Zambia. Although China’s loans for
infrastructure projects include low transaction costs, and flexible repayment options, China lacks
transparency and shares inaccurate data on loan terms and conditions. China uses these flexible
repayment options, debt forgiveness, and participation in peacekeeping operations to gain
influence and access to natural resources on the continent. To make the China- Zambia
relationship mutually beneficial and not exploitative, the following must occur:
1. China must become more transparent in its lending. China's policies are often unclear.
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Although Chinese companies provide reporting to the EITI on some of the EITI implementing
countries, China is not an implementing country. Because countries are not legally bound,
depending on interests in a particular country, Chinese companies can omit or refrain from
reporting based on their activities. For China to be held accountable China must become an
implementing country and adhere to the transparency standards of the EITI. Once the Chinese
government becomes an implementing country, the EITI can better engage with government and
strengthen transparency and accountability.
2. Corruption must be curbed to observe the benefits of loans, aid, and investments.
A study on the correlation of corruption, economic growth, and income inequality in Africa by
Kwabena Gyimah-Brempong found that corruption directly and indirectly decreased economic
growth in many African countries.126 Corruption decreased per capita growth rate by decreasing
the productivity of existing resources and reduced investment. 127 Gyimah-Brempong’s study
results helps to explain Zambia’s current economic status. In 2019, Zambia’s corruption rank
increased from 105 to 113. Prior to 2019, aid and investments from Finland Ireland, and Britain
were withheld because of concerns about corruption and financial mismanagement. 128 Britain
expressed concerns regarding Zambia’s high levels of corruption. Britain refrained from
providing the country with any aid and advised the county to take measures to fight
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corruption.129 In spite of enacting an Anti-Corruption Act, Zambia’s reputation as a responsible
partner has fallen because of alleged corruption by government officials. As Gymiah- Brepong
finds, Zambia needs to introduce institutional reforms to reduce corruption so that aid received
can be properly allocated towards the intended development objectives.
3. The Zambian government must make changes to their aid relations
Zambia has received a significant amount of foreign aid from the IMF, World Bank, China, and
other lenders. In 2021, ForeignAssistance.gov reported that Zambia requested USD307.23
million in foreign aid from the United States despite defaulting on Eurobond loan and expanding
external debt burden. Through this action, the Zambian government has shown their
irresponsibility and management of aid and loans. Despite the implementation of an Aid Policy
and Strategy in 2005 to ensure proper management and coordination of aid, the Zambian
government has failed to strengthen its financial management systems. Zambia’s 2030 Vision to
promote sustainable development can be only achieved by abiding by the Aid and Policy
Strategy
The Zambian government must diversify its economy and reduce its dependence on copper
production and exports.
Zambia’s National Development Plan’s goal is to diversify the economy for sustainable growth.
According to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative's Zambia EITI Report 2019, the country's
mining sector accounted for 28% of the government's revenues and 77% of export earnings. 130 The
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Zambian government’s plan to incorporate agriculture and tourism into their economy is a step
forward to speed up diversification of the economy and reduce its reliance on copper and, other
natural resource exports, and foreign aid.
Two significant challenges lie ahead in the relationship between Zambia and China.
Zambia's economy continues to rely heavily on copper and other mineral exports as its main
source of growth and the country continues to battle a growing debt crisis. Due to COVID-19,
the country has defaulted its loans and has simply borrowed beyond its means. Despite the
Zambia's high risk of debt distress, the government of China continues to lend to Zambia.
Zambia is responsible for its national debt; however, China must be a responsible lender. In my
view China has some accountability for Zambia’s distress.
7.2 Conclusion
British colonial rule left a lasting impact on Zambia’s development even after
independence in 1964. As Andersson, Per-Åke, et al discussed in their analysis, Zambia has
been left with many economic disparities, corruption, racial divide, and gender inequality post
colonialism. Although Zambia has abundant natural resources, the China-Zambia partnership is
not mutually beneficial. Chinese governments gain ownership of assets and control the
availability of employment opportunities associated with their projects and mining operations.
Despite all obstacles and the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, African countries are
resilient. Analysis by Brookings found that African countries could establish economic growth
momentum if effective leadership is established. Investment’s inflows are projected to increase
in the future and trade patterns are expected to diversify post COVID-19. Brookings found that
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post the pandemic, the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) is likely to transform
low productive and labor-intensive sectors to higher productivity and skills-intensive industrial
activities.131 This is said to promote intra-Africa trade and promote economic diversification,
reaching the AU Agenda and UN Sustainable Development Goals.
There are many complex challenges ahead however, if African governments can establish
mutually beneficial trade and investment partnerships, countries will have an abundant amount
of opportunities for economic growth with equity. 132
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Annex I- The Five and Eight Principles
Table 1: The Five and Eight Principles
The five principles
outlined by Premier
Zhou:

The eight principles
of China’s
engagement with
Africa:

1. China supports the African and Arab peoples in their struggle to oppose
imperialism and old and new colonialism and to win and safeguard national
independence.
2. China supports the pursuance of a policy of peace, neutrality, and non-alignment by
the governments of the African and Arab countries
3. China supports the desire of the African and Arab peoples to achieve unity and
solidarity in the manner of their own choice.
4. China supports the African and Arab countries in their efforts to settle their
disputes through peaceful consultations.
5. China holds that the sovereignty of the African and Arab countries should be
respected by all other countries and that encroachment and interference from any
quarter should be opposed.

1. The Chinese government always bases itself on the principle of equality and mutual
benefit in providing aid to other countries. It never regards such aid as a unilateral
aid but as a mutual event
2. In providing aid to other countries, the Chinese government strictly respects the
sovereignty of the recipient countries, never attaching any conditions nor expecting
any privileges.
3. China provides economic aid in the form of interest-free or low-interest loans and
extends the time limit for repayment, when necessary, to lighten the burden of the
recipient countries as much as possible.
4. In providing aid to other countries, the purpose of the Chinese government is not to
make the recipient countries dependent on China but to help them embark step by
step on the road of self-reliance and independent economic development.
5. The Chinese government tries its best to help the recipient countries build projects
which require less investment while yielding quicker results, so that the recipient
government may increase its income and accumulate capital.
6. The Chinese government provides the best quality equipment and material of its
manufacture at international market prices. If the equipment and material provided
by the Chinese government are not up to the agreed specifications and quality, the
Chinese government undertakes to replace them.
7. In giving any technical assistance, the Chinese government will see to it that the
personnel of the recipient country fully master such technique.
8. The experts dispatched by China to help in construction in the recipient countries
will have the same standard of living as the experts of the recipient country. The
Chinese experts are not allowed to make any special demands or enjoy a special
amenity
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Annex II- Figures & Graphs
Figure 1: Chinese vs. US FDI 133

Figure 2: Increased FDI in Zambia134
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Figure 3: Growth, export growth, and global copper prices

Figure 4: Chinese Controlled production in Africa
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Figure 5: Chinese Workers in Zambia 2009-2019135

Figure 6: China Five-year plan growth targets 136

Figure 7: CAD Fund facts137
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